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SUMMARY 
 
Stress Tests are conducted by national supervisors as well as by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA). This paper aims to make a critical analysis of the latest edition of the stress tests published 
on 15th July 2011. To achieve this objective, we have also established a secondary aim: to examine 
the financial and patrimonial situation of some of the European and Spanish banks in the period 
2010-2012, taking into account the relevant EBA index.  
 
From the historical data available, we can conclude that the aggregate Net Equity of the example 
we analysed, from 2010, including the recapitalization estimated by the EBA, reached a level of Net 
Equity/Assets, not even reached by the equivalent figures for 1985 (without recapitalization). 
Considering that Net Equity constitutes a safety zone for creditors in general, it can be stated that 
this basic criterion of solvency has deteriorated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS 
The latest edition of the stress tests was published on 15th July 2011 (Article 35 (2) (b) of the EU 
Parliament and Council Regulations Nº 1093/2010, dated 24th November 2010). These resistance 
tests are designed and developed by the EBA1, along with national banking supervisors (in our case, 
the Bank of Spain), the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Their aim is to 
assess the ability of the European banking system to withstand adverse scenarios, and thus lend 
transparency to the market, as well as establishing the additional capital required to ensure the 
solvency of the banking sector and its components in stressful scenarios. 
 
                                                 
1  The European Banking Authority (EBA) is composed of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks of 
the European Union. Its features include giving advice to the European Commission, on request, either within a time limit which the 
Commission may set depending on the urgency of the matter, or directly to the Committee itself, in particular as regards the preparation 
of draft measures within the scope of credit activities. It also has the task of ensuring EU directives are correctly implemented and the 
convergence of financial supervisory practices in member states across the whole European Community. The EBA officially began to 
operate on 1st January 2011 after the disappearance of the CEBS, and from then on, took over its duties and responsibilities. 
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One new feature we can point out, as regards the 2010 analysis, is the strengthening of the 
methodology of exercise, including macroeconomic assumptions, definitions of Core Tier 1 Capital 
and the ratio threshold (5% as opposed to a solvency ratio of 6%, in 2010). 
 
Significant stress scenarios were taken into account in the evolution of the banking system’s balance 
sheets by the effect of a significant increase in the risk premium to individual funding costs for each 
entity. 
 
The European Commission designed, for this latest edition, a macroeconomic profile to calibrate 
the Spanish banking system's capacity to withstand the following adverse scenarios: 
 
- Reduction in economic activity measured by a decrease of 1% in GDP for the year 2011 and 1.1% 
for the year 2012 (2.1% in cumulative terms). 
 
- Predicted negative evolution of property prices in the period December 2010 to December 2012 
of: 
 
+ Housing: - 21.9%. 
+ Commerce (including land): - 46.7%. 
 
- Sudden fall in stock market index of 20.7 %2. 
- Unemployment rate of 21.50%. 
- Increase in the cost of long-term public debt of 165 basis points (in other words, the stress tests 
have been performed assuming that the long-term rates in Spain would be around 6.5%). 
 
In any case, these stress tests are theoretical predictions based on statistical simulations, and so 
should not be considered as evolutionary economic forecasts. At this point, therefore, it is worth 
remembering that Stress Tests are not forecasting applications, and so these models are more like 
the antithesis of the financial instability described by (Borio and Drehmann 2011), as they have 
been designed for conditions that do not involve severe macroeconomic shocks. This year’s Stress 
Tests were carried out taking into account the static, unchanging balances in the period analyzed, 
and so the initial data on which the estimates are based are the balance sheets at the close of 31st 
December 2010.  
 
This paper aims to make a critical analysis of the latest edition of the stress tests. To achieve this 
objective, we have established a secondary aim: to examine the financial and patrimonial situation 
of some the European and Spanish banks in the period 2010-2012, taking into account the relevant 
EBA index.  
 
In this article, we will also present an economic, financial and statistical analysis of the 
consequences of critical scenarios designed for this edition of the stress test: turnover cuts and the 
                                                 
2 In the period from 1-10 August 2011, the Ibex-35 index lost 8,000 points, which meant that in this period there had been a decrease of 
17.2%. 
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occurrence of losses, particularly in the loan portfolio, which significantly affect the deterioration of 
assets. 
 
 
2. EBA REFERENCE POINTS FOR IMPLEMENTING STRESS TESTS 
 
Before developing this point, we must take into account a basic question about the possible ways 
there are of processing information, such as the commonest and most accurate software used for 
empirical analysis in the fields of IT and social sciences. 
 
The scenario map models are processes in which a wide variety of tools and stages are used. 
Basically, there are two kinds of processes of these types of models, "bottom-up" and "top-down". 
In the second category, the supervisor evaluates the internal models of each bank to process the 
information. 
 
A combination of the two was used in this edition of the Stress Tests by the EBA as well as in 
other initiatives, such as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) or the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009).  
 
2.1. SOVEREIGN DEBT AND CORPORATE FINANCING IN THE INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIO 
 
As far as fundamental credit analysis is concerned, the risk was assessed using one of the following 
two methods: 
 
- IRB Methodology (Basel), adapted to EBA norms, in which each banking organization must 
assess these types of scenarios based on the evolution of the probability of default (PD) for its loss 
given default (LGD) and carried out through two possible approaches, unexpected losses (UL) and 
expected losses (EL). 
 
- Standard Method: like the Basel provisions, banks based their analysis and valuation on 
established by the ECAI3 ratings. Depending on the starting qualification level, the following 
options could be used to evaluate the rating: 
 
* AAA / Aaa: rating would be unchanged  
* AA / Aa2 to A- / A3: rating would be lowered two categories. 
* BBB + / Baa1 or less: rating would be lowered four categories with soil (CCC or junk bond). 
 
In Spain’s case, in particular, the sovereign debt rating according to the different agencies was, at 
that time4, as follows: 
 
* Moody's: Aa2 with a negative outlook. 
                                                 
3 External credit assessment or credit rating institutions/agencies. 
4 http://www.bloomberg.com/Bloomberg, (1st June 2011). 
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* Standard & Poor's: AA with a negative outlook. 
* Fitch: AA +: with a negative outlook. 
 
A guide provided by the European supervisor EBA (2011) quantified the impact of sovereign debt 
on the investment portfolio, stating that the worst case scenario (the lowest rating, CCC, or 
equivalent) would involve significant assumptions based on corporate standards with a default 
probability of around 36.5%. 
 
2.2. INCREASES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT EXPOSURE IN THE TRADING PORTFOLIO 
 
After reading the EBA review, the most striking cases in point were Greece, Ireland, Portugal and, 
to a lesser degree, Cyprus. As far as Spain is concerned, the EBA did not alter the initially 
established rating, which in the author’s point of view was an error, because only a few months 
later, the markets themselves changed the main points of this approach. 
 
Table 1, below, shows the main EBA reference points for implementing the Stress Tests and their 
impact: 
Figure 1: EBA Reference Points for running Stress Tests 
Impact on 
Core Tier 1
Assets Liabilities and equity
DEFAULT
RESTRUCTURING
Macro-scenario      Increasing cost of
Evolution of
interest rates
Liquidity risk in the
values sector
 
Market
risk
     financing funds
Investment portfolio
Loans and 
outstanding balances
Debt securities
Bonds, notes and 
securities
Trading portfolio
Residencial and 
commercial real estate
Wholesale market 
funds
Interbank money 
market
Retail funds
Equity
 
 (Compiled by the authors from EBA data) 
  
3. BASIC ECONOMETRIC PRINCIPLES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  
It is very important to bear in mind that Stress Tests are based on non-linear models (Drehmann 
et al., 2007;  Juselius and Kim, 2011) and their econometric support is poor. The reason for this 
assertion lies in the fact that these models do not record satisfactorily the effects of episodes of 
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stress. Linear models, to be exact, tend to show responses to such eventualities (Alfaro and 
Drehmann, 2009), but the degree of trust is extremely limited: the relevant episodes (in the present 
case of a macroeconomic profile designed by the EBA) are rarely completely covered and are 
therefore inconsistent. That is the reason why models tend to show inaccuracies precisely during 
episodes of stress. 
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF KEY STATISTICS IN THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM 
EXAMINED BY STRESS TESTS. 
 
4.1. PRELIMINARY NOTES ON THE STATE OF SOLVENCY AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM. 
 
Before discussing the statistical analysis of the results of the Stress Test, we will analyze the normal 
ratios in the banking industry. As reference, we will cite two different scenarios from the 
Consolidated Balance Sheet of Credit Institutions of Spain, as well as Banking Supervision Records 
from the Bank of Spain (2007 to 2010), (Calvo, 2010; Tamames, 1985 and 1996). For this 
analysis, the comparative table is shown below for the years 1985 to 2010 
 
Table 1: Solvency and financial management ratios for the Spanish credit system 
31/12/2010
29/11/1985 30/04/1996 31/12/2000 31/05/2006 31/03/2008 31/12/2010 + Recapitalizatión
              Net Equity
         Total Liabilites
       Total Liabilities
     Net Equity
       Total Liabilities
    Total assets
Net Equity
Total assets
93.60%
NET EQUITY RATIO
x100 8.72% 9.08% 7.05% 7.43% 7.36% 5.62% 6.40%
92.95% 92.57% 92,64% 94.38%
PASSIVE RATIO
x100 91.28% 90.92%
12.46 12,59 16.79 14.61
LEVERAGING
10.47 10.02 13.18
SOLVENCY AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT RATIOS
SOLVENCY RATIO
x100 9.55% 9.98% 7.59% 8.03% 7.94% 5.95% 6,84%
 
Compiled by the authors from the Bank of Spain Banking Supervision Records and the Manual of the Spanish  
Financial System (CALVO, J, 2010) 
From the above table, it can be deduced, among other points, that: 
1. - In 1985, the Spanish credit system had a solvency of 9.55%, and went on to raise this level to 
nearly 10% in 1996. Between 2000 and 2008, it remained at around 8%; however, at the end of 
2010, it fell to 5.95%. We must remember that these solvency ratios, from the general public’s 
perspective, and even more so from clients, investors and the State’s point of view, were not exactly 
ideal: only 5.95% of equity and 94.05% of external funds does not exactly reflect a situation of 
"solvency" for an organization belonging to the financial sector. 
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2. – The leverage of the Spanish financial system in 1985 and 1996 was rated at around 10. Already 
in 2000, this indicator rose significantly to stand at 13.18, showing that debt was gaining ground in 
the economic balance. However from 2006, this figure improved and settled at around 12.5. 
However, in 2010, it rose again to 16.79, which shows that equity itself had lost prominence at the 
expense of debt. Therefore, if we take the first scenario as a reference point and compare it with the 
year-end 2010, the credit system had increased its leverage significantly. 
 
3. – As for the ratio of liabilities in the year 1985, for every € 100 of economic structure of the 
Spanish credit system balance, borrowed funds accounted for € 91.28 of that figure, and remained 
in the range of € 90-92.6 for the period 1996 to 1998. However, at the end of 2010, for every € 100 
of assets, € 94.38 was financed by external sources. 
 
4. - Finally, as regards the net equity ratio, starting at figures of around 9% until 1996, this ratio 
shows us that the equity financed total investment in 2000 at a rate of € 7.05 for every € 100; and 10 
years later, this occurred at a rate of € 5.62 in € 100. The ratio also indicates that for every € 100 of 
total financial structure in 2000, € 7.05 was equity in 2000 and a decade later, € 5.62. This means 
that the participation of debt in the financial structure is becoming greater and greater. It must also 
be remembered that this ratio shows unmistakable signs of weakness. 
 
4.2. DATA SOURCE FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF STRESS TEST RESULTS 
 
Results of the stress tests can be viewed on the EDPS website, with a sample of Spanish banks 
EBA (2011 a). Below is a statistical analysis of this data, taking into account the solvency ratios with 
different elements of loss absorption. 
 
4.3. REGULATORY CAPITAL RECONCILIATION AND EXTRACTION OF CORE TIER 1 
 
It should be noted that these stress tests were implemented on the basis that banks, savings banks 
and SIPs5 were able to strengthen their balance sheets during the first four months of the year 2011 
by increasing their capital and obligatory restructuring plans. 
 
The Spanish banking system made significant increases in equity before the end of April 2011 to 
ensure its resilience in the EBA stress tests of that year. In the Spanish banking system sample 
analyzed, equity was increased by € 41,208 million. This was achieved by different means: Ordinary 
Capital gains (Common Equity) derived from RDI 2/2011, private market funding, general 
provisions, convertible bonds, divestitures or capital gains, in the following way: 
 
- Ordinary Capital increases (Common Equity) derived from RDI 2/2011 to the value of € 14,472 
million.  
- Amounts deriving from general provisions up to December 31, 2010 of € 17,752 million. 
- Convertible bonds and other instruments amounting to € 9,164 million.  
 
The figures given above can be shown in relative values using the graph below: 
                                                 
5 Integration formula for credit companies without loss of legal personality. 
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Graph 1: Increase in Heritage in Spanish Banking System (January-April 2011)  
35%
43%
22%
RDI 02/2011 
Generic provisions
Convertibles and others
 
 (Compiled by the authors from EBA data) 
 
Equity, as measured by the estimated regulatory capital according to the definition of the EBA to 
December 2010, for the sample we analyzed, amounted, in the baseline scenario, to € 139,863 
million (Core Tier 1 of 7.4% of the sum of weighted assets based on static balance in an unstressed 
scenario, amounting to € 1,900,519 million). 
 
After discounting the net damage or surpluses and the effects of dividends and other items, we 
arrive at a net regulatory capital in absolute terms amounting to € 130,064 million. 
 
If we add to this figure the RDI 2/2011 capital of € 14,472 million or capital increases, equity for 
the sample tested in the stressed scenario would amount to € 144,536 million (Core Tier 1 of 7.3% 
of € 1,991,274 million). We can illustrate this in the table below, which shows the figures discussed 
above: 
Table 2: Reconciliation of Regulatory Capital in base and stress scenarios  
REGULATORY CAPITAL RECONCILIATION IN BOTH SCENARIOS In millions of euros I - REGULATORY CAPITAL (SCENARIO NOT STRESSED: 31-12-2010) 139 863 II. - Net 13,598 Impairment III.-Dividends and other 3,799 IV. - Regulatory capital without RDL 2/2011 and no increases in capital * (I + II + III) 130,064 V - Capital Gains arising from RDI 2/2011 + private issues 14,472 VI. - REGULATORY CAPITAL STRESSED ON STAGE WITHOUT RDL 2/2011 CAPITAL OR (IV + V) 144 536 * Includes capital issues and obligations during fiscal converted stres whose decision has been taken between 01.01.2011 and 30.04.2011.139,963
II.- Net Deterioration -13,598
III.-Dividends & others 3,799
IV. -Regulatory Capital without RDL 2/2011 and with no increases in capital * (I+II+III) 130,064
V.- Increase in capital dervied from RDl 2/2011 + private emissions 14,472
VI.- REGULATORY CAPITAL IN STRESSED SCENARIO WITHOUT RDL 2/2011 OR INCREASES OF CAPITAL (IV+V) 144,536
* Includes emissions of capital and debentures converted during the period of stress, where the decision was taken between 01.01.2011 and 30.04.2011.
REGULATORY CAPITAL RECONCILIATION IN BOTH SCENARIOS
In millions of euros
 
 (Compiled by the authors from EBA information) 
 
The addition of the sample considered would evolve in the following way: starting from a solvency 
as measured by Core Tier 1 of the initial stage at the year-end 2010 of 7.4%, it would decrease to 
7.3% in a stressed scenario two years later (a fall of 0.1%). 
 
The volume of final Regulatory Capital, as defined by the EBA, would be € 171,271 million, a 
figure which represents a Core Tier 1 of 8.6% of the € 1,991,274 million weighted assets mentioned 
above. The table below illustrates the different factors involved in obtaining the final Regulatory 
Capital. 
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Table 3: Obtaining the Final Regulatory Capital 
I.- Regulatory capital without RDL 2/2011 or increases in Capital 144,536
II.- General provisions * 17,572
III.- Regulatory capital with general provisions (I+II) 162,108
IV.- Divestments and other business deceisions up to 30.04.2011 2,483
V.- Other mandatory convertible bonds 5,417
VI.- Others 1,264
VII.- Regulatory capital as of Dec 2012, with other elements which absorb losses (III+IV+V+VI) 171,272
In millions of euros
OBTAINING THE FINAL REGULATORY CAPITAL 
 
(Compiled by the authors from EBA information) 
 
In addition, risk assets (the denominator of Core Tier 1) would rise from € 1,900,519 million in an 
unstressed baseline scenario to € 1,991,274 million in the adverse scenario (a rise of 4.8%). This 
increase is particularly important in light of the rationale used by the EBA for considering balance 
in static terms, which leads to zero growth in nominal terms. Moreover, it should be noted that this 
increase in RWA is basically due to the change in valuation of assets of credit risk (IRB approach) 
and in particular because of assets which are considered to have failed. 
 
In this adverse scenario, there would be 7 financial institutions with a Core Tier 1 in the range of 5-
6%. The breakdown by institutions and ranking is shown in the graph below:   
 
Graph 2: Number of Spanish banks, classified by Core Tier 1 ranking  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
≤ 4% ≤ 5% ≤ 6% ≤ 7% ≤ 8% ≤ 9% ≤ 10% >10%
Nº of entities 
 
(Compiled by the authors from EBA data) 
 
While the aggregate capital shows an average well above the 5% threshold even in a stressed 
scenario, the dispersion, in the case of financial institutions in the analyzed sample, shows quite 
different results with a considerable degree of dispersion. 
 
If we apply the Core Tier 1 differential to both scenarios (baseline and stressed), the following 
conclusions can be reached: 
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1. The largest negative differential would be that of BBVA and Banca March, which would 
accumulate a -1.3 percentage point difference, which would indicate that despite the impact of the 
macroeconomic table designed by the EBA, they would improve their solvency as measured by 
Core Tier 1. 
 
2. At the other extreme would be Colonya-Caixa: what is most noticeable is the baseline scenario 
with a Core Tier 1 of 11.2% from 6.2% in the stressed scenario, which would mean a loss of 
solvency of 500 basis points. Another entity that shows a decline in solvency in these circumstances 
would be Banco Pastor, by 4.3% (we should remember they have already been absorbed by Banco 
Popular). 
 
5. EUROPEAN BANKS, A STUDY CASE: DEXIA 
 
In 2011, what happened to the French-Belgian bank Dexia had a special impact. Here is an analysis 
of its capital structure, its risk and its solvency. 
 
First, solvency will be analyzed through the Core Tire 1 (expressed in millions of euros) in EBA 
base and stress scenarios (2011 d). The analysis uses the Core Tier 1 ratio: 
 
 
 
                                   Tier 1 Ordinary Capital or Basic Capital  
         Core Tier 1= ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                       Risk-weighted Assets (RWA)  
 
                                                               17,002 
Core Tier 1 (December 2010) = ----------------------- x 100                      12.1 % 
                                                               140,835 
 
                                                               15,204           
Core Tier 1 (December 2012) = ----------------------- x 100                      10.4 % 
                                                             146,439  
                                    
 
However, in order to analyze the situation in greater detail, the attached table shows the different 
components of this financial institution’s capital up to 30 June 2010, compared with the same 
period of 2011, by cumulative quarterly periods (latest data given 30/06/2011) by Dexia and 
CreditSights (2011): 
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Table 4: Reconciliation of Dexia Capital  
 30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
I   BASIC CAPITAL 14,426 18,635 18,743 18,903 18,852
II  Minority participations 679 663 660 645 644
III  Deduction of trading fund and other intangible assets -1,941 -2,169 -2,262 -2,422 -2,492
IV  Regulatory adjustments -139 -139 -139 -139 -139
V  CORE TIER 1 (I+II+III+IV) 13,025 16,990 17,002 16,987 16,865
VI  Hybrid debt/capital instruments 1,423 1,452 1,423 1,431 1,351
VII  TIER 1 CAPITAL (V+VI) 14,448 18,442 18,425 18,418 18,216
VIII  Supplementary capital 3,215 3,063 3,417 3,198 3,617
IX  Regulatory adjustments -1,191 -1,250 -1,206 -955 -1,125
X  TOTAL REGULATORY CAPITAL (VII+VIII+IX) 16,472 20,255 20,636 20,661 20,708
Millions of euros
C O N C I L I A T I O N    O F    C A P I T A L
 
(Compiled by the authors from CreditSights and Dexia data) 
 
From the above, it follows that: 
- By 30/06/11, the Core Tier 1 decreased compared with the previous quarter by € 3,965 million 
(down 23.33%). 
- In this case, Total Regulatory Capital fell in the same time period by the sum of € 3,783 million (a 
decrease of 18.67%). 
 
The table below analyzes the Risk-Weighted Assets during this same period (30/06/2010 to 
30/06/2011) for Dexia and CreditSights (2011), relating them to the capital figures in the table 
above, which produces solvency ratios which are also presented below: 
 
Table 5: Risk-weighted assets and capital ratios of Dexia  
30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Credit risk 110,169 125,499 128,240 130,292 135,537
Market risk 7,183 2,983 2,945 3,251 3,298
Operative risk 9,650 9,650 9,650 10,419 10,419
TOTAL RWA 127,002 138,132 140,835 143,962 149,254
30/06/11 31/03/11 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Core Tier 1 capital ratio 10.3% 12.3% 12.1% 11.8% 11.3%
Tier 1 capital ratio 11.4% 13.4% 13.1% 12.8% 12.2%
Total capital ratio 13.0% 14.7% 14.7% 14.4% 13.9%
Risk-weighted assets (RWA)
C a p i t a l  R a t i o s  
(Millions of euros)
 
 (Compiled by the authors from CreditSights and Dexia data) 
 
Therefore, it can be stated that Dexia's solvency was affected primarily because the effect of the 
deterioration of the different components of capital exceeded the reduction of the risk weighted 
assets. 
 
What happened last August was particularly interesting: this entity published quarterly losses as a 
result of the deterioration of its Greek debt portfolio. 
 
Next, we will analyze its credit risk: this entity on 31-12-2010 had a direct position of exposure to 
gross sovereign debt amounting to € 56,245 million EBA (2011 c). Of this sum, € 3,462 million (i.e. 
6.15%) was Greek debt, € 1,927m (3.42%) Portuguese, € 15,009m (26.68%) Italian and € 1,443m 
(2.56%) was Spanish. 
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Even more surprising was the European supervisor EBA ruling (2011 b): the sovereign debt rating 
according to ECAI (this brought the possibility of PD default at each step in the ECAI ratings 
which was assigned by the EBA at the time) was: 
 
* Greece:  
- Moody's: B1. 
- Standard & Poors: B. 
- Fitch: B+ 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a PD of 5.78%.* 
 
*Italy:  
- Moody's: Aa2, stable outlook. 
- Standard & Poor’s: A+, negative outlook. 
- Fitch: AA-, negative outlook. 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a PD of 0.18%. 
 
* Portugal:  
- Moody's: Baa1, stable outlook. 
- Standard & Poor’s: BBB-, negative outlook. 
- Fitch: BBB-. 
This step in the ECAI ratings was assigned by the EBA a PD of 1.17%. 
 
If we analyse the events now with hindsight (the publication date of the Stress Test was July 11 and 
the publication date of the losses by the company was 15 August 2011), the supervisor undoubtedly 
made a serious error. In particular, the rationale used by the EBA to consider this asset at a fair 
value and not to have accounted for it at market value was a mistake. The above statements are 
supported by the following arguments: 
 
a. - This bank revealed, after bank stress tests, € 10,000m of unrealized losses to date in its trading 
portfolio, of which € 7,000m was sovereign debt. This was due primarily to a reclassification carried 
out by the bank on its financial situation. We must bear in mind that the assets that any bank has in 
its trading portfolio may lead to losses in recessionary periods as a result of their adjustment to a 
fair value. Banks are able to transfer those assets to their investment portfolio and avoid future 
losses, according to the provisions of an amendment by the International Accounting Standards 
Board6 to the International Accounting Standard No. 39: Recognition and Measurement and IFRS 
7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures (IASB 2008). 
 
The above legislation establishes that such transfers between trading and investment portfolios as a 
result of unrealized losses (as might be the case of differential market value and fair value) must be 
deducted from the total equity of the entity in question (and not on Core Tier 1). It is precisely at 
                                                 
6 The IASB was founded on April 1, 2001 as the successor to the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). It is 
responsible for developing International Financial Reporting Standards (the new name for International Accounting Standards issued 
after 2001), and promoting the use and application of these standards. 
Book of Proceedings – TMS Algarve 2012 vol. 3 
 
 
1051 
 
this point where some of the triggers of the current situation of Dexia can be found, since this 
option was used widely and continuously, leading to the situation that its Core Tier 1 feigned 
robustness when analyzed by the EBA in the Stress Test. 
 
b. – Similarly, we can state that the trigger may have been the risk weighting: government debt is 
not always without risk and even more so in the case of the Greek government (with a 5.78% 
possibility of default) 
 
c. – It should be added that the impact on tangible equity of this entity was not actually taken into 
account: it was based on total tangible assets, not adjusted assets, as in the case of Basel II. The 
tangible common equity of a bank can be defined as the sum of total equity plus the non-
controlling participation in the subsidiaries, minus mercantile credit and unamortized intangible 
assets. 
 
Tangible common equity is calculated by dividing tangible common equity between risk-weighted 
assets. In the financial sector, this difference in concept and approach may be considerable. The 
table below shows the data from this entity for the period 30/06/2010 to 30/06/2011, by 
cumulative quarters, compiled by Dexia and CreditSights  (2011): 
Table 6: Ratio of Dexia’s Tangible Capital  
 30/06/11 31/03/2011 31/12/10 30/09/10 30/06/2010
Total consolidated assets (millions of euros) 517,747 526,636 566,735 588,054 608,510
RWA/Total consolidated assets 24.5% 26.2% 24.9% 24.5% 24.5%
Consolidated equity; including minority (millions of euros) 8,761 11,453 10,728 10,830 9,331
Tangible Capital Ratio 1.7% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.5%
Core Tier 1 / tangible assets 2.5% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 2.8%
Tangible Capital Ratio / Core Tier 1 capital ratio 16.5% 17.7% 15.7% 15.6% 13.6%
  
T a n g i b l e   C a p i t a l   R a t i o 
 
(Compiled by the authors from CreditSights data) 
 
From the above, it can be deduced that, regarding Tangible Capital Ratio, for every € 100 of total 
assets, including risk-weighted assets, Dexia had € 1.9% of Tangible Common Equity available on 
31-12-2010 (and 1.7% six months later). What is most striking is not how this coefficient has 
evolved, but its amount, which is clearly lower than the European sector average (average of 4%) or 
the American sector average (average ranging from 6% to 7%). 
 
It is also vital to analyze the relationship between Tangible Capital Ratio and Core Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio, since, as of 30/06/2011, it stood at 16.5%, which resulted in a low level of the highest quality 
capital among all the equity considered by the EBA for the implementation of the Stress Tests. 
 
Finally, as of September 30th, 2011, other information must be added which attests to the weakness 
of the financial institution analyzed and the inadequacy of the solvency ratios used by Dexia (2011). 
At that date, the entity’s balance, € 412,000 million, was backed by a net equity of as little as € 1,100 
million. However, the Core Tier 1 calculation made at the same date produced a score of € 7,800 
million, or 9.9%. 
 
J.de la Lastra & J. Fruet-Cardozo 
 
1052 
 
6. NEW CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FROM THE EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEM 
 
On October 26th 2011, the EBA, following the agreement reached by the European Council on the 
plan to recapitalize European banks, published the Core Tier 1 figures needed for the affected 
Spanish banking sector to reach the 9% threshold set by that body. The deadline given to the sector 
to reach the agreed figures was June 30th 2012. The total amounted to € 26,162 million. 
 
However, it must be noted that the above figure was only provisional in nature, since the final 
calculation was modified, on December 8th, to produce a definitive calculation for the group of 
five Spanish banks affected of € 26,171 million, a figure that includes the exposure to sovereign 
entities included in the year up to September 30th, 2011. 
 
If we analyze the sample of European banks as a whole, as of June 30th 2012, the 65 banks surveyed 
are also required to reach a Core Tier 1 of 9% of their risk weighted assets (RWA). This component 
of capital was calculated as a net figure, including valuation losses on sovereign debt exposures at 
September 30, 2011. In the following graph, with the data available on the European supervisor 
website, EBA (2011 e), on a logarithmic scale (base 10), the ordinate shows the Core Tier 1 (net 
sovereign debt) and the abscissa the different scenarios of RWA. The banks are shown beneath the 
regression line (capital = 0.09 RWA); these had, as of late September 2011, a rate below the 9% 
target with a total deficit of € 84,685 million. The aggregate deficit of the 71 banks in the EBA 
sample amounted to € 114,685 million, a figure that includes six Greek banks. 
 
Graph 3: Recapitalization of the European banking system  
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(Compiled by the authors from EBA data) 
 
7. MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
The decision of the EBA to anticipate the Basel III recommendations and apply them prior to June 
2012 has serious overtones as a result of the adverse scenarios for European economies. To meet 
the needs estimated by the European supervisor in Spain’s particular case, as discussed in the 
previous section, the recapitalization reached by that body was initially € 26,162 million, for the five 
banks involved . According to a study by Barclays Capital7, this figure would mean a conversion of 
Core Tier 1 to risk weighted assets of over € 290,000 million. 
 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix 1. 
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This study estimates at € 727,000 million the total assets affected by this conversion. In any case, 
according to the banks affected, we should consider that the net capital requirements would 
amount to € 15,871 million after calculating the convertible debt. This would mean, according to 
this study, around € 433,000 million of assets which Spanish banks would have to get rid of in the 
unlikely event of them not generating enough capital, a figure which represents around 40% of 
Spain's GDP and 12% of the assets of the Spanish financial system as a whole. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
From the study of the regulations and economic data analyzed, it can be concluded that European 
supervision and standards seek to strengthen the foundations of the European system and try to 
implement an improvement in regional financial stability. It also pursues the incentive of 
establishing new liquidity standards and tries to avoid accumulation as well as leverage in the banks.  
 
This does not take into account that the application of stress tests may have suffered a certain laxity 
in the following areas: 
 
- Some lobbyists in the industrial sector have argued that given the diversity of the sector, the 
Minimum Total Capital Ratio does not apply uniformly to all of them. 
 
- It can be stated that there are certain gaps in the basic considerations such as deferred assets or 
the discount on financial holdings in insurance companies. 
 
- It is a fact that, due to the diversity of regulations and supervision of domestic banking systems of 
each country, certain differences do exist as regards areas such as preferred stock or countercyclical 
provisions. 
 
- The preponderance of the EBA Core Tier 1, without considering other solvency ratios which are 
very common in this sector, such as tangible capital. 
 
- Evaluation criteria followed by the EBA of the sovereign debt on the balance sheets in banks, 
starting from its fair value and not updating to their market value at the time of the initial estimates. 
 
Since the launching of banking supervision on a national level with the birth of the Basel 
Supervisory Committee in February 1974, it can be seen, just as we have discussed in section 4.1 of 
this study, that there has been a significant decline in the % of Net Equity of the Spanish Credit 
System over total assets. Thus, it fell from levels of around 9% in 1985 and 1996, to about half that 
figure (5.62%) in 2010. 
 
It should be added that the aggregate Net Asset Value in the year 2010 and the recapitalization 
estimated by the EBA (section 6 of this study), would reach a level of Equity / Assets which would 
not even exceed the level analysed in March 2008, when it stood at 7.43%, just as has been shown 
in section 4.1, nor even the 1985 records. 
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Given that Equity constitutes, or at least should constitute, a security strip for creditors in general, 
we can say that this basic criterion of solvency has deteriorated.  
 
Therefore, all the financial engineering that the EBA proposes is carried out on a net equity which 
is obviously insufficient. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic impact of EBA capital requirements.  
Estimation of Transposition Estimation % of assets 
EBA  from Core Tier 1 of Weighted of financial
Country recapitalization to RWA Risk (*) % GPD system
Cyprus 3,587 39,856 99,639 571% 73%
Greece 30,000 333,333 833,333 362% 170%
Portugal 7,804 86,711 216,778 126% 38%
Spain 26,162 290,678 726,694 68% 20%
Belgium 4,143 46,033 115,083 33% 10%
Austria 2,938 32,644 81,611 29% 8%
Italy 14,771 164,122 410,306 26% 10%
Slovenia 297 3,300 8,250 23% 16%
France 8,844 98,267 245,667 13% 3%
Norway 1,312 14,578 36,444 11% 5%
Switzerland 1,358 15,100 37,750 10% 3%
Germany 5,184 57,600 144,000 6% 2%
Denmark 47 522 1,306 1% 0%
Totals 106,447 1,182,744 2,956,861 33% 10%
Absolute figures in millions of euros.
(*) Around 40% of assets  
(Compiled by the authors from Barclays Capital data) 
